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Abstract
Large retailers competing with smaller stores that carry a narrower range can
exercise market power by pricing below cost for some of their products. Below-cost
pricing arises as an exploitative device rather than a predatory device (e.g., Chen
and Rey, 2012). Unlike standard textbook models, we show that positive consumer
value is not required in these frameworks. Large retailers can sell products o¤ering
consumers a negative value. We use this insight to revisit some classic issues in
vertical relations.
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1 Introduction
One line of research in industrial organization examines the phenomenon of loss-leading
when retailers are multi-product rms (i.e., Chen and Rey, 2012; Chen and Rey, 2016;
and Johnson, 2017). Large retailers competing with smaller stores that carry a narrower
range can exercise market power by pricing below cost for some products also o¤ered
by smaller rivals. Loss-leading does not appear for predatory reasons: rather pro-
competitive justications are invoked. For example, in Chen and Rey (2012) below-
cost pricing arises as an exploitative device to discriminate between multi-stop shoppers
and one-stop shoppers. The result is shown in a standard model where the goods
o¤er consumers a positive value as in textbook models. In this article, we demonstrate
that positive value is not required for the goods which are priced below cost. Large
retailers can sell products o¤ering consumers negative values. Our result emerges from
a recalculation of Chen and Reys original model in allowing for a negative consumer
value for the good which is priced below-cost.1
We organize the paper as follows. Section 2 presents Chen and Reys (2012) model
and we then show our result. In Section 3, we provide some applications of our result
in vertical relations, and we conclude in Section 4.
2 The model and results
In order to make our results as clear as possible and directly comparable, we rst start
in Subsection 2.1 with the simple example used by Chen and Rey (2012).2 Then, we
extend this setting in Subsection 2.2.
2.1 A simple example
Suppose two goods A and B, consumers value A at uA = 10 and B at uB = 6. There are
two rms: L and S. While L is a multi-product rm which can supply A and B, S only
supplies B. L supplies A at no cost and supplies B at unit cost cL. Let vL = uB   cL
denote the consumer value of the good B at L. Chen and Rey assume in this example
that cL = 4 which results in vL = uB   cL = 2: the good B o¤ers consumers a positive
1We also extend our results to Chen and Rey (2016) and Johnson (2017) in the Appendices.
2See p. 3466.
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value at L. We do not restrict attention to cL = 4; instead we say that the good B
o¤ers consumers a positive value if vL > 0, that is, cL < uB = 6 and a negative value if
vL  0, that is cL  uB = 6. B is also o¤ered by S which is a competitive fringe, at a
price bp = 2. Let vS = uB   bp denote the consumer value of the good B at S; we obtain
vS = 4. We assume that vS > vL, which translates into vL < 4, that is cL > 2.
Consumers face a shopping cost s for visiting a store, reecting the opportunity cost
of the time spent in tra¢ c, selecting products and so on.3 We suppose further that half
of the consumers face a high shopping cost s = 4, whereas the others can shop at no
cost, that is s = 0.
If L were a monopolist, implying that S were not present in the market, it is easy
to show that B would be sold only if vL > 0. Thus, if L were alone, it would supply A
and B to all consumers at a total price pmAB = uA + uB   s = 12, and would obtain a
prot mAB = p
m
AB   cL = 12   cL.4 It could also supply A only to all consumers at a
price pmA = uA  s = 6, which results in a prot of mA = 6.5 L would supply A and B if
cL < 6 and would supply A only if cL  6 which corresponds to uB = 6. L would thus
supply A and B if vL > 0 and A only if vL  0. The result is not surprising as rms
only supply goods o¤ering consumers values which are positive. This suggests the idea
as found in textbook models that "only goods which deliver consumers a positive value
are sold by a multi-product rm".
Suppose now, instead, that L is not a monopolist and good B is also o¤ered by S,
which o¤ers consumers a value of vS = 4. S cannot attract high-cost consumers, who
would obtain vS s = 0; L can therefore still charge them a total price pmAB. As shown by
Chen and Rey (2012), due to the presence of S, L can now screen consumers according to
their shopping costs by selling B below cost (i.e., pB < cL): keeping the total price equal
to pmAB = 12 it can lower the price for B down to pB = 2, and increasing the price for A
to pA = 10. This does not a¤ect the shopping behavior of high-cost consumers, who still
face a total price of pmAB, but increases the margin earned on low-cost consumers, who
now become multi-stop shoppers and buy B from S. This loss-leading strategy allows
3It may also account for consumersenjoyment or dislike of shopping.
4Selling to low-cost consumers only at a total price pAB = uA + uB = 16 leads to a lower prot
AB = (16  cL) 12 = 8  cL2 < 12  cL for any cL < 8, which is satised for vL > 0.
5Selling A to low-cost consumers only at a price pA = uA = 10 leads to a lower prot A = 10 12 =
5 < 6.
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L to charge the monopoly price to one-stop shoppers and, here, extracts the full value
of A from multi-stop shoppers.
To make our point, we rst start with the case vL = 0, that is uB = cL. While in the
monopoly case, where L would be indi¤erent between supplying A and B and supplying
A only, L is now better o¤ by supplying A and B. Focusing on high-cost consumers
who are one-stop shoppers, L is indi¤erent between supplying A and B and supplying
A only. The two strategies lead to the same monopoly margin from these consumers:
pmAB   cL = pmA = 6. However, in the presence of S, L can now charge a higher price pA
to low-cost consumers who are multi-stop shoppers and buy B from S. By keeping the
total price equal to pmAB, in selling B below cost, and in increasing the price for A, it can
obtain to a higher margin on low-cost consumers. While the margin on these consumers
were pmAB   cL = pmA = 6 without S, the margin is now pA = 10 which leads to a total
prot of 1
2
pA +
1
2
(pmAB   cL) = 8 instead of pmAB   cL = 6 without S. The presence of
S thus allows L to screen consumers according to their shopping costs, which makes
supplying null-valued good by L protable.
The result still holds in the case where vL < 0, that is uB < cL, as long as the
gains of screening (i.e., pA   pmA = 4) are larger than the losses of supplying A and B
(i.e., (pmAB   cL)   pmA ) instead of supplying A only. With half of the consumers facing
a high shopping cost while the others can shop at a lower cost, L makes losses on one-
stop shoppers (high-cost consumers) by supplying A and B instead of B only, that is
1
2
[(pmAB   cL)  pmA ] = 12 (6  cL). However, L makes gains on multi-stop shoppers (low-
cost consumers), that are 1
2
(pA   pmA ) = 124. Comparing losses and gains, L supplies A
and B instead of supplying A only if cL < 10, that is vL >  4. Thus, as shown by Chen
and Rey (2012), the presence of small rivals allows L to screen consumers according
to their shopping costs, but this strategy of selling B below cost opens a door to a
new insight. Indeed, L can now supply goods that are competitive, for which consumer
values are negative; here, the good B is sold for any vL >  4.
2.2 A more general setting
We now extend the previous setting in a simple way, and, in particular, we allow for
any proportion of low and high shopping costs. Let  and 1   denote the proportion
of low- and high-cost consumers (i.e., s = 0 and s = 4) respectively.
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We denote by vA, vL the consumer values o¤ered by L and by vS the consumer value
o¤ered by S (vA > vS > vL). As previously, we assume vA   s > 0 and vS   s  0 such
that S cannot attract high-cost consumers. This leads to high-cost consumers either
buying at L or not buying at all. In the previous numerical example, vA = uA cA = 10,
vS = uB   bp = 4, and these assumptions were satised: vA   s = 6 > 0 and vS   s = 0.
As we focus on negative consumer value o¤ered by L on the competitive segment, we
assume vL < 0, that is vL = uL   cL < 0.
We denote by r = pA   cA + pB   cL, rA = pA   cA and by rL = pB   cL Ls total
margin, the margin for A and for B respectively, with r = rA + rL.
As we did above, we rst assume that L is a monopolist, implying that S is not
present in the market; it is easy to show that the good B is not sold when vL < 0. Two
cases should be distinguished but in any case, B is not sold; L can supply A either to all
consumers (as above) or to low-cost consumers only. Let rA = vA   s = vA   4 denote
Ls margin for A in the former case and rA = vA  s = vA Ls margin for A in the latter
case. When it supplies the good A to all consumers, it obtains rA = vA   4, and when
it supplies A to low-cost consumers only it gets rA = vA. Comparing the prots,
the result is that it supplies A to all consumers if  < vA s
vA s =
vA 4
vA
and A to low-cost
consumers only if   vA 4
vA
.6 Then, it can also supply A and B, however, B is not sold
(in any case) because vL < 0.
Suppose now, instead, that L is not a monopolist and the good B is also o¤ered by
S. As previously, we assume that S is a competitive fringe; S o¤ers consumers a value
vS. We show that while in the monopoly case L would be better o¤ in supplying A only,
either to all consumers or to low-cost consumers only, L is now better o¤ in supplying
A and B to all consumers for vL < 0, whatever the proportion of high and low shopping
costs are.
When the proportion of low-cost consumers is small, that is,  < vA s
vA s =
vA 4
vA
, L
supplies A only to all consumers at rA if it were alone. The presence of the competitive
fringe allows L to screen consumers according to their shopping cost. Keeping the total
margin unchanged on high-cost consumers such that vA + vL   r  s = vA   rA   s = 0
(i.e., r = rA + vL), lowering the margin for B down to rL =   (s  s) + vL (i.e.,
6In above numerical example, with vA = 10 and vL < 0, the good A was sold to all consumers
because  = 12 <
vA s
vA
= 35 .
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rL =   (rA   rA) + vL =   (s  s) + vL with rA + rL = r and rA = rA) and increasing
the margin for A to rA = rA = vA   s does not a¤ect the shopping behavior of high-
cost consumers (who still face the same margin) but increases the margin earned on
low-cost consumers (who now become multi-stop shoppers). L earns a total prot
rA + (rA + vL) (1  ) = (vA   s) + (vA   s+ vL) (1  ) with rA = rA and r =
rA + vL, which can be greater than rA = vA   s, that is the prot it would obtain in
selling A only to all consumers. Comparing the gains and losses of screening, this is true
as long as the gains on low-cost consumers, which are (rA   rA) = (s  s), are larger
than the losses on high-cost consumers, that are ((rA + vL)  rA) (1  ) = vL (1  ).
The result is that L earns a higher total prot if  (s  s) >   (1  ) vL with vL < 0,
that is vL >  (s s)(1 ) which gives vL >   4(1 ) . This case corresponds to the situation
we developed in the numerical example above.7
When the proportion of low-cost consumers is high (i.e.,   vA s
vA s =
vA 4
vA
), the
situation is di¤erent, but the same logic applies. If L were alone, it would supply A
to low-cost consumers only at rA = vA   s. The presence of the competitive fringe
allows L to screen consumers according to their shopping costs, by pricing the good
B below cost. Without changing the margin for A, which is still equal to rA = rA,
L can now attract high-cost consumers by charging rL =   (s  s) + vL on the good
B. With Ls total margin, which is equal to r = rA + vL = (vA   s) + vL, high-cost
consumers buy A and B from L. Low-cost consumers still buy A only from L because
they are multi-stop shoppers, and high-cost consumers now become shoppers because
they are interested in buying the basket (i.e., the good A and the good B). L earns a
total prot rA + (rA + vL) (1  ) = (vA   s) + (vA   s+ vL) (1  ) with rA = rA
and r = rA + vL, which can be greater than rA = (vA   s), that is the prots it
gets in selling A only to low-cost consumers. While prots on low-cost consumers are
unchanged, L can now earn (vA   s+ vL) (1  ) on high-cost consumers, which were
not possible without the competitive fringe. Assume vL = 0, L benets of the presence
of S because this allows it to screen consumers according to their shopping costs: L
charges rA = rA and rL =   (rA   rA) which leads to a total margin of r = rA (high-
cost consumers become shoppers instead of not buying at all and low-cost consumers
are multi-stop shoppers and buy B from S instead of buying A only). The benets for
L are thus given by rA (1  ) = (vA   s) (1  ) for vL = 0. At the end, this strategy
7With  = 12 , vL should be larger than  4.
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is protable for vL < 0, as long as the benets on high-cost consumers are positive, that
is, vL >  rA =   (vA   s).
We summarize our results in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Suppose L faces a competitive fringe of small retailers, L supplies A
and B to all consumers whatever the proportion of high and low shopping costs even if
vL < 0; in particular, L supplies A and B to all consumers if vL >  (s s)(1 ) =   4(1 )
for  < vA s
vA s =
vA 4
vA
and if vL >   (vA   s) =   (vA   4) for   vA 4vA .
Proof. See the text above.
Figure 1 summarizes results in Proposition 1 for numerical values used above (vA =
10, vS = 4, s = 0 and s = 4) according to the proportion of low shopping costs.
Figure 1
This insight which may seem quite surprising is due to the presence of small retailers
which allows the large retailer to screen consumers according to their shopping costs.
While a multi-product monopolist has no incentive to protably introduce a good with
a negative value, a multi-product rm which competes with small retailers on some
segments has an incentive to protably introduce products on these segments even if
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its products o¤er consumers negative values. By selling these products below cost, the
multi-product rm can discriminate between the low-cost consumers (who are multi-stop
shoppers and buy some products from the multi-product rm and these products from
the small retailers) from the high-cost consumers (who are one-stop shoppers and buy
all goods, i.e., the basket of goods from the multi-product rm). Our insight provides a
rationale for why multi-product rms are able to o¤er a larger product line at no benet
(i.e., vL = 0) or at a loss (i.e., vL < 0).8
While we demonstrate our results in a simple example, similar insights can be pro-
vided by using the general model of Chen and Rey (2012). Interestingly, similar insights
also apply in Chen and Rey (2016), in which multi-product rms with di¤erent com-
parative advantages compete for consumers with heterogenous shopping patterns. In
their setting, competition for one-stop shoppers drives total prices down to cost, but
rms subsidize weak products with the prot made on their strong products. Negative
consumer values for weak products thus arise because multi-product rms price these
products below cost.9 Recently, Johnson (2017) considers a setting in which one-stop
shoppers may underestimate their needs, and shows that below-cost pricing may emerge
when consumers have di¤erent biases across products. In particular, loss-leader prod-
ucts tend to be products that consumers purchase regularly. Our insight that negative
consumer values for these loss-leader products is feasible, once again applies to these
products.10
Using the simple example above, we now provide some applications of our insights
on vertical relations in the following section.
3 Applications in vertical relations
We provide two applications. First, we discuss access to the retail market (using the large
retailer) for a supplier for which the good o¤ers a negative consumer value, providing an
example in which below-cost pricing is good for the supplier. Second, we demonstrate
8For example, assuming that L faces a xed cost to introduce the product L, that is F ; our analysis
shows (for vL = 0) that there exists a positive F such that L has incentive to introduce B whatever
the proportion of low-cost and high-cost consumers are. Using calculations above, threshold values in
F are given by (s  s) for  < vA svA s and by (vA   s) (1  ) for   vA svA s .
9We provide an example in Appendix A.
10See Appendix B for an example.
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that a large retailer that benets from an alternative source of supply which provides
a negative consumer value for this good may have buyer power vis-à-vis an e¢ cient
supplier of this good. This latter application helps us to show that the assortment
strategy of a large retailer may interact with the buyer power of this retailer when it
competes with smaller retailers.
3.1 Access to the retail market
L is a multi-product retailer which provides two goods, A and B. In this subsection, we
consider a scenario where the good B at L is being supplied by a supplier. The supplier
can produce B at a constant marginal cost c  0 and o¤ers a take-it-or-leave-it two-part
tari¤ contract (wL; FL), where wL and FL, respectively, are the wholesale price and the
xed fee paid to the supplier by the large retailer. The timing of the game is as follows:
rst, the supplier o¤ers contracts to the large retailer, which decides whether to accept
or reject the contract, and then the large retailer sets retail prices.
For notational simplicity, we denote the market value of the good B as vL = uB  
cL   c, where cL represents the retailing cost of the large retailer. Furthermore, we
assume that the market value of good B is negative, that is, vL < 0 (to focus on our
point) Then, there is a competitive fringe S of small retailers that sells the good B at
a price bp, providing consumers a utility of vS = uB   bp. As previously, we assume that
consumers face shopping costs s and s, and that vA > vS and vS  s.
Using previous results, we can write the retail margins of the large retailer and
its gross prots. We denote by vL (wL) = uB   cL   wL the consumer value of the
good B at L for a wholesale price wL. Retail margins are thus given by rA = rA and
rL =   (s  s) + vL (wL) which leads to:
AL = (vA   s) + (vA   s+ vL (wL)) (1  )
= mA + [(s  s) + vL (wL) ((1  ))] for  <
vA   s
vA   s ,
and:
AL = (vA   s) + (vA + vL (wL)  s) (1  )
= mA + (vA + vL (wL)  s) (1  ) for  
vA   s
vA   s ,
9
as gross prots for the large retailer.11
Then, the supplier sets its contract to maximize the following:
max
wL;FL
(wL   c) (1  ) + FL
s.t. AL   FL  mA ,
and the xed fee is set so as to just satisfy the participation constraint of the large
retailer. Since the retailer is the residual claimant of the total prots, the supplier sets
its wholesale price to maximize the multi-product retailers prot and hence wL = c.
The suppliers prots are thus given as:
[(s  s) + vL ((1  ))] for  < vA   s
vA   s ,
and (vA + vL   s) (1  ) for   vA   s
vA   s .
The above implies that the supplier of good B can supply its good for vL < 0, that
is vL >  (s s)(1 ) for  < vA svA s and vL >   (vA   s) for  
vA s
vA s (see our previous
analysis).12 The supplier is thus able to protably supply the good B at L even if its
good has a negative market value. Our application provides a clear example whereby
below cost pricing is good for the supplier, echoing the ndings of von Schlippenbach
(2015). However, we go further in this application and say that the supplier has the
incentive to introduce a good for which the market value is negative.
3.2 Buyer power and alternative source of supply
There are a number of reasons to explain why large buyers obtain price discounts from
sellers (e.g., Dobson and Waterson, 1999; Inderst and Mazzarotto, 2007). One of these
is to assume that large buyers can turn to other sources of supply and can thus demand
11mA which represents, here the outside option of the large retailer is given by: 
m
A = (vA   s) for
 < vA svA s and 
m
A = (vA   s) for   vA svA s :
12While we provide an analysis in assuming that the supplier o¤ers two-part tari¤ contracts to the
large retailer, our analysis still holds in linear-contracting for values of vL dened in the main text;
however, equilibrium contracts would be di¤erent.
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better terms from suppliers.13 In these kinds of models, large retailers have access to
other sources of supply and can turn to these other sources if they dislike the e¢ cient
suppliersterms. Price discounts thus emerge when large retailers have positive outside
options, which corresponds to the "textbook" view.14
In our present setting, the large retailer is a multi-product rm. While the previous
view arises when the large retailer is a monopolist, that is, the large buyer has buyer
power if it has a positive outside option, buyer power may also arise if the large retailer
has a negative outside option when it competes with small retailers. It is the combination
of both "access to an alternative supplier" and "seller power " (i.e., its ability to price
these goods below cost) which allows the large retailer to have discounts even if it has
a negative outside option.
In this application, we assume that L has a relationship with an e¢ cient supplier for
the good B. However, it has also access to an alternative supplier which is modeled as
a competitive fringe. As previously, we assume that the e¢ cient supplier makes take-
it-or-leave-it o¤ers to L in two-part tari¤s. Let vL = uB   cL  c denote the consumers
value o¤ered by the e¢ cient supplier at L and evL = vL = uB   cL   ec the consumers
value o¤ered by the alternative supplier at L with vL > evL (c and ec denote, respectively,
the constant marginal cost of the e¢ cient supplier and of the alternative supplier). We
assume that evL < 0 in order to focus on a negative outside option. The retail market
and consumer behavior are unchanged.
L is a multi-product monopolist. There is no scope for L to exert buyer power
vis-à-vis the e¢ cient supplier of the good B because L has access to a negative outside
option for this good (i.e., evL < 0). The prot of the large retailer is given by its monopoly
prot on the good A, that is, mA and the supplier extracts the monopoly prot for the
good B. In this case, only a positive outside option for this good, that is, evL > 0 would
allow L to obtain better terms for the e¢ cient supplier.
L is in competition with S on the good B. The view changes drastically:
while L had mA as an outside option when it was a monopolist, it now has eAL as
an outside option, which can be greater than mA even if evL < 0. This insight comes
13Integrating backward and producing the good themselves is an alternative solution, which is also
mentioned.
14See Katz (1987), and more recently Caprice (2006) and Caprice and Rey (2015) for applications
with this modeling of buyer power.
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from our previous analysis: a multi-product rm which competes with small retailers
on a specic segment has an incentive to protably supply a product for which the
consumers value is negative on this segment. By selling this product below cost, the
multi-product rm can discriminate between consumers according to their shopping
costs, which allows products with a negative consumer value to be protable. Using our
previous simple example, we obtain eAL = (vA   s) + [(s  s) + evL ((1  ))] which
corresponds to mA + [(s  s) + evL ((1  ))] when  < vA svA s and eAL = (vA   s) +
(vA + evL   s) (1  ), that is, mA + (vA + evL   s) (1  ) for   vA svA s . While L would
have no buyer power when it were a monopolist, it has buyer power now as it can extracteAL   mA instead of mA .
Figure 2 illustrates our insight, that is, eAL   mA for evL = 0 and numerical values
used above (vA = 10, vS = 4, s = 0 and s = 4) according to the proportion of low
shopping costs. Note that this buyer power arises whatever the proportion of high and
low shopping costs are (for evL = 0). In particular, starting from a situation where all
consumers have the same shopping costs, introducing an arbitrarily small number of
consumers with di¤erent shopping costs su¢ ces to give some buyer power to the large
retailer, which was not the case for  = 0 or  = 1.
Figure 2
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Our result contrasts with the standard textbook view about buyer power, in which evL
should be positive. While in the analysis of market power of large retailers buyer power
and seller power are generally studied separately, our insight suggests that both can
interact.15 In particular, the assortment strategy of big-box retailers can help them to
benet from buyer power in product categories for which products are sold at below-cost
prices.
4 Conclusion
Chen and Reys (2012) model captures one of the key characteristics of the modern
retail market: consumers face shopping costs and large retailers o¤ering large product
line benet from seller power. The recalculation of Chen and Reys (2012) paper provides
new insights. Contrary to the conventional wisdom which requires positive consumer
value for a multi-product rm, we show that goods with a negative consumer value can
be provided by multi-product retailers as long as below-cost pricing on these goods is
optimal.16
We provide two applications of our result on vertical relationships. First, we demon-
strate that a supplier facing a negative consumer value can access the retail market when
it negotiates with a large retailer. The supplier of the loss-leader product benets from
the large product line of the large retailer. The latter prices this product below cost and
the supplier has access to the market, and thus the supplier can benet from a large
retailers below-cost pricing strategy. Second, we demonstrate that a positive consumer
value as demand-side substitution is not required in order for a large retailer to benet
from buyer power. When a large retailer prices some products below-cost, it does not
need to have positive consumer values as a demand-side substitution for these products.
Its seller power (i.e., here, its opportunity to price below cost) helps it to benet from
buyer power, even if it has a negative consumer value as a demand-side substitution.
While we focus here on vertical relations, interesting insights of our results in relation
15Note as an exception, Caprice and Shekhar (2017) which denes buyer power in the same way, but
focuses on the impact of the countervailing power on consumers and total welfare. In particular, they
show that countervailing power is detrimental to consumers and total welfare when the market power
of the large retailer is dened by both seller power and buyer power; however, they do not deal, as here,
with the introduction of negative market value products.
16We extend our insights to alternative modelings, such as, Chen and Rey (2016) and Johnson (2017).
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to product line competition could also be provided. However, we leave this task for
further investigation.
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Appendices
A Illustration from Chen and Reys (2016) paper
We focus on the simple example (page 6) and transform it slightly in order to demon-
strate our point more clearly within their setting.
Consumers wish to buy two goods, A andB, which can both be supplied by two rms,
1 and 2. Let vA1 and v
B
1 denote consumer values for A and B from rm 1, and v
A
2 and
vB2 consumer values for A and B from rm 2. We assume that rms are symmetric such
that vA1 + v
B
1 = v
A
2 + v
B
2 ; however, rm 1 enjoys a larger consumer value for A (v
A
1 > v
A
2 )
whereas rm 2 enjoys a larger consumer value for B (vB2 > v
B
1 ): v
A
1 = v
B
2 > v
A
2 = v
B
1 .
Consumers face a shopping cost, reecting the opportunity cost of the time spent in
tra¢ c, selecting products and so on. Some consumers face a "low" shopping cost, that
is s, such that they will adopt multi-stop shopping behavior, purchasing each product at
the lowest available price. Let  denote the proportion of these consumers. While some
consumers incur a low shopping cost, other consumers face a "high" shopping cost, that
is s, and (1  ) denotes the proportion of these consumers.
Let rA1 , r
B
1 and r1 denote rm 1s margins for A and B, and the total margin, such
that r1 = rA1 +r
B
1 and r
A
2 , r
B
2 and r2 rm 2s margins for A and B, and the total margin,
that is r2 = rA2 + r
B
2 .
Suppose rst, as do Chen and Rey (2016), that consumers face a high shopping
cost (smaller than vA1 + v
B
1 = v
A
2 + v
B
2 ). In equilibrium, consumers behave as one-stop
shoppers, that is, they buy both products from the same rm, and thus only the total
margin, r1 and r2 matter. As the rms deliver the same consumer value, Bertrand-like
competition drives the basket margin down to zero: r1 = r2 = 0.
Suppose instead that all consumers face a low shopping cost such that, in equilib-
rium, consumers behave as multi-stop shoppers and purchase each product at the lowest
available price. Asymmetric Bertrand competition then leads rms to sell weak products
at a zero margin, and strong products at a margin equal (or just below) the consumer
value gain minus consumersshopping costs: rA1 = v
A
1   vA2   s = rB2 = vB2   vB1   s (i.e.,
vA1   rA1   s = vA2 and vB2   rB2   s = vB1 ). Note that rA1 = vA1   s and rB2 = vB2   s if
vB1 = v
A
2 < 0.
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Next, suppose that a fraction of consumers face a high shopping cost, that is, s,
whereas the others have a low shopping cost, that is, s. As shown by Chen and Rey
(2016), cross-subsidization naturally arises. As before, erce price competition dissipates
prots from one-stop shoppers, and drives basket margins down to zero: rA1 + r
B
1 =
rA2 + r
B
2 = 0. Then, keeping the total margin constant for one-stop shoppers, it su¢ ces
to undercut the rivals weak product by the amount of s to attract multi-stop shoppers.
It follows that equilibrium margins are given by:
vA1   rA1   s = vA2   rA2 ;
vB2   rB2   s = vB1   rB1 :
Replacing rB1 and r
A
2 by  rA1 and  rB2 (as rA1 + rB1 = 0 and rA2 + rB2 = 0), we obtain:
vA1   rA1   s = vA2 + rB2 ;
vB2   rB2   s = vB1 + rA1 :
By symmetry, rA1 = r
B
2 and r
A
1 =
vA1  vA2  s
2
= rB2 =
vB2  vB1  s
2
, the result is rB1 =
 vA1  vA2  s
2
= rA2 =  v
B
2  vB1  s
2
. This pricing strategy does not a¤ect the shopping be-
havior of high-cost consumers (who still face a zero margin), but generates a positive
prot from multi-stop shoppers, who buy A from rm 1 and B from rm 2, giving each
rm a positive margin of v
A
1  vA2  s
2
=
vB2  vB1  s
2
on these consumers.
We now focus on our point and assume that vA1 = v
B
2 > s and v
B
1 = v
A
2 < 0:
Suppose rst, that rm 1 were alone (by symmetry, the same analysis applies for
rm 2 by replacing good A by good B and good B by good A), as vB1 < 0, rm 1 would
only supply good A. Two cases should be distinguished as long as all consumers are
served or low-cost consumers only are served, but in any case rm 1 would only supply
good A. We can dene a threshold in  such that, for low , rm 1 provides the good
A to all consumers and, for high , rm 1 provides the good A to low-cost consumers.
Next, we suppose that both rms compete (our previous analysis applies) and we
can show that rm 1 supplies A and B and rm 2 supplies A and B even if vB1 = v
A
2 < 0:
Numerical example: vA1 = v
B
2 = 26 > s = 20 and v
B
1 = v
A
2 =  2 < 0. We can dene
consumer utilities and costs as follows: uA1 = u
B
2 = 36, u
B
1 = u
A
2 = 28 and c
A
1 = c
B
2 = 10,
and cB1 = c
A
2 = 30. We also assume for the numerical example that s = 2.
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When rms are monopolists, the threshold in  is given by  = 1
4
, but in any case,
each rm only provides its strong product as vB1 = v
A
2 =  2.
When the rms compete, rms supply both goods, which generates a prot of
vA1  vA2  s
2
 =
vB2  vB1  s
2
 = 13 for each rm, even if vB1 = v
A
2 =  2. Q.E.D.
B Illustration from Johnsons (2017) paper
Following Johnsons (2017) paper, we assume asymmetric competition, in which a large
retailer L with a full product line competes against a small rm S with a limited product
line.17 We focus on the pricing behavior of the large retailer and we assume that the
small rm is not a strategic player: the expected "in-store" utility of shopping at retailer
S will be given by bUS.
L carriesm products. For simplicity, we assume thatm = 3. Let c1, c2 and c3 denote
the retailing costs of the large retailer for these products. Prices are perfectly observed
by consumers, who then decide whether or not to go shopping.
A consumer who visits retailer L purchases quantities x1, x2 and x3 to maximize:X
i
 i [ui (xi)  pixi] ; i = 1; 2; 3;
where  i 2 (0; 1) is a binary random variable after the consumer chooses the large
retailer but before nal in-store purchasing decisions are made. Hence, for any i that
is carried by L, a consumer has zero demand for it (so that  i = 0) and so buys zero
units, or instead has a positive demand for it (so that  i = 1) and so buys quantity xi to
maximize ui (xi)  pixi. Let vi (pi) denote the indirect utility associated with product i:
vi (pi) = maxxi ui (xi)   pixi; we obtain dvi(pi)dpi =  xi. The values f ig are realized
independently of each other, and independently and identically across consumers. The
true probability that a consumer has positive demand for i is given by i. That is, for any
given consumer, Pr [ i = 1] = i > 0. While the true probability is i, each consumer
believes that he will have positive demand for product i with some probability bi withbi 6= i. Consumers make unplanned purchases such that i  bi. Let i = bii denote
the accuracy ratio with i  1.
17We use the version (2017), forthcoming in AER.
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Because consumers believe that they will have a positive demand for i with proba-
bility bi, each consumer forecasts his expected "in-store" utility of shopping at retailer
L to be: bUL = X
i
bivi (pi) :
As noticed previously, the expected "in-store" utility of shopping at retailer S is
given by bUS.
Consumers choose whether to shop at retailer L or at retailer S by considering the
values
nbUL; bUSo. The number of consumers shopping at L is given by QbUL; bUS.
Let Q1 denote the derivative with respect to the rst argument; Q1 > 0 so that Q is
increasing in bUL. Properties of QbUL; bUS can be found in Johnson (2017, page 6).
The large retailer knows the true probabilities fig but also know that consumers
forecast their utility values
nbUL; bUSo based on the values nbio. The result is L sets
prices to maximize:
Q
bUL; bUS L,
where L =
P
i i (pi   ci)xi (pi).
Dene Li (pi) =
pi ci
pi
i (pi), where i (pi) =
pix
0
i(pi)
xi(pi)
; Li (pi) is the Lerner index of
good i multiplied by its elasticity, so that if L were simply maximizing (pi   ci)xi (pi),
it would choose a price pi such that Li (pi) =  1 (by using the rst-order condition:
(pi   ci)x0i (pi) + xi (pi) = 0).
We assume in the following in order to make our point, that xi (pi) = a  pi. Then,
we assume that c1 = c2 = c < a; however we put no restriction on c3. We will say that
good 3 o¤ers consumers a positive value if c3 < a and o¤ers consumers a negative value
if c3  a. So that, if L were simply maximizing (p3   c3)x3 (p3), it would choose a price
p3 such that L3 (p3) =  1 if the consumer value of the good 3 were positive and it would
not sell the good in case of negative value, that is c3  a.
From the maximization problem of L which is given by maxp1;p2;p3 Q
bUL; bUS L,
we derive rst-order conditions (i = 1; 2; 3):
@L
@pi
= Qi [xi (pi) + (pi   c)x0i (pi)] +Q1
bidvi (pi)
dpi

L = 0:
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Using dvi(pi)
dpi
=  xi (pi) and Li (pi) = pi cpi i (pi) leads to:
@L
@pi
=
xi (pi)bi [Qi [1 + Li (pi)] Q1L] = 0:
Then, with i =
bi
i
, we obtain:
1
i
[1 + Li (pi)] =
Q1
Q
L,
as it is derived in Johnsons (2017) paper (see page 9).
We assume that 1 < 2 < 3 and that p2 = c at equilibrium. We know from
Proposition 1 (page 9) that good 3 is priced below-cost because 2 < 3. The result
is that, assuming c3 = a, good 3 is sold because it is priced below-cost at equilibrium:
p3 < a. By continuity, there exists a threshold in c3 > a such that good 3 is sold even
if it provides consumers a negative value (i.e., c3 > a). The result is obtained because
good 3 generates tra¢ c to the large retailer. As claimed by Johnson (2017), goods with
few unplanned purchases behave in this way (we can think about bread, milk, and so
on). While these goods may provide consumers negative values at L, they can be sold
by L, which corresponds to the point we demonstrate in the present paper. Q.E.D.
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